

MAKIHARA Kohmei

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Aix-Marseille School of Economics,
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FIELDS OF INTERESTS

Economics of Network, Game Theory, Mechanism Design, Public Economics

On the 2024/2025 Job Market.

EDUCATION

- Sep.2021- Present: PhD candidate, Aix-Marseille University, AMSE, France
Supervisors: Sebastian Bervoets and Mathieu Faure,
- Sep.2019 - Aug. 2021: Master of economics with highest honors, Aix-Marseille University, AMSE, France
- Sep.2015 - Aug. 2016: Exchange program to the University of Strasbourg / Sciences Po Strasbourg, France
- Apr.2013 - Mar.2017: Bachelor of economics, Kyoto University, Japan

RESEARCH VISITS

- Feb. 2024 - Apr.2024: Columbia University, Host: Evan Sadler
- Jun. 2023: University of Konstanz, Host: Susanne Goldlücke

REFERENCES

Sebastian Bervoets

Aix-Marseille School of Economics
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Mathieu Faure

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Evan Sadler

Columbia University
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Francis Bloch

Paris School of Economics
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JOB MARKET PAPER

“Robust Mechanism Design on Network with Externalities”

Abstract: This paper examines the allocation problem of a good with a positive externality, in a setting where monetary payments are absent, and each agent knows not only their own valuation but also the valuations of other agents to whom they are connected in a network. The principal's goal is to allocate the good to the agent with the highest valuation. Due to the positive externalities, agents' incentives are partially aligned with the principal's objective—an agent not only wants to receive the good but also prefers that the agent with the highest valuation receives it if they do not. The paper identifies the types of networks in which the principal can correctly identify the agent with the highest valuation by proposing an incentive compatible and fully efficient mechanism which asks agents for both their own valuation and those of their neighbors, regardless of their beliefs about agents they are not directly connected to. Without any belief restrictions, the principal can achieve her objective if and only if at least two agents are connected to everyone in the network. Under a mild belief restriction of full support, the principal can achieve her objective if there is at least one agent connected to everyone.

WORKING PAPER

“[Public Goods in Networks: Comparative Statics Results](#)”, with Sebastian Bervoets, AMSE working paper 2023-17 (Conditionally accepted in Journal of Economic Theory)

WORK IN PROGRESS

“Morality in a General Positive Externality Environment”, with Mathieu Faure

CONFERENCES, SEMINARS, WORKSHOPS

2024: French/Japanese Conference on Asian and International Economies (Aix-en-Provence), Conference on Mechanism and Institution Design (Budapest), AFSE Annual Congress (Bordeaux), International Conference on Public Economic Theory (Lyon), LAGV (Marseille), Mediterranean Game Theory Symposium (Marseille), Columbia micro theory colloquium (New York)

2023: ASSET annual meeting (Lisbon), Microseminar day at Thurgau Institute of Economics (Konstanz)

2022: Conference on Mechanism and Institution Design (Online), RES Symposium of Junior Researchers (online), Game Theory and Applications (online), AFSE Annual Congress (Dijon), International Conference on Public Economic Theory (Marseille), Workshop on Network & Development (Naples)

TEACHING

- Jan. 2022 - Apr. 2022: Industrial Organization, Aix-Marseille University, Undergraduate Tutorial (in French)
- Sep. 2021 - Dec. 2023: Microeconomics 1, Aix-Marseille University, Undergraduate Tutorial (in French)

GRANTS AND SCHOLARSHIPS

- Sep. 2020 - Jun. 2021: Academic fellowship of Aix-Marseille University, France
- Sep. 2015 - Jun. 2016: Keidanren Global Scholarship, Japan

OTHER ACTIVITIES

- Oct. 2022 - Dec. 2023: Member of AMSE laboratory council as a representative of PhD students

SKILLS

Languages

- Japanese: Native
- English: Fluent
- French: Fluent

Software

- MATLAB, R, STATA, Python